The European Union has recently introduced the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) to provide a consistent set of rules concerning Eurozone bank resolution.
systemically important Eurozone banks would have exclusively required equity writedowns to cover impairment losses. However, to ensure adequate capitalization post bail-in, the majority of large, listed banks would have required conversion to equity for all subordinated and some senior debt creditors. Depositors would not have experienced writedowns in any of the banks examined. Given the subjective nature of resolution triggers outlined in the SRM, we also study the potential benefits of market and balance sheet dependent triggers. While our findings suggest some weak evidence of a capacity to differentiate between failed and surviving banks, the results are indicative of the difficulties in mandating predefined quantitative resolution triggers.
Introduction
The global financial crisis and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis have yielded strong evidence for the dangerous links between bank failure and sovereign distress. Historically, a persistent increase in government debt has been shown to be a consequence of banking crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013) . In an attempt to sever the link between banks and the sovereign, the European Union has introduced a formal framework of procedures to deal with bank resolution. Under this framework, banks on the precipice of failure may be subject to resolution with investors suffering writedowns before public funds may be called upon. The aim of this study is to retrospectively examine the implications of the resolution framework for Eurozone banks and their creditors during the global financial crisis.
The Bank Resolution and Recovery directive (BRRD) has been introduced to provide a consistent set of rules surrounding bank failure in the 28 countries of the European Union. In this paper, we focus on the Single Resolution Mechansim (SRM), the means by which the BRRD will be implemented in Eurozone countries.
In order to understand the scale of the problem for Eurozone banks during the crisis, we first detail the level of impairments realized due to losses over the period 2008 − 2012 . Under the SRM guidelines, these losses would have been applied to investors, motivating our examination of the balance sheet liabilities of Eurozone banks with particular focus on the largest systemically important institutions. In this context, we then retrospectively apply the bail-in 1 rules mandated by the EU to Eurozone banks during the crisis and examine their impact on differing bank creditors.
2 Finally, given the somewhat subjective nature of the resolution triggers 1 Bail-in refers to recapitalization of banks through the mandatory write-down of liabilities or, alternatively, the conversion of liabilities to equity.
2 For an outline of developments in European banking over recent decades, see Goddard et al. (2007) .
mandated under the European resolution framework, we examine the benefits of a range of market and balance sheet based resolution triggers.
Our findings are generally supportive of the resolution framework. Total impairment charges for Eurozone banks over the period 2008 through 2012 are measured at e621 billion. In our retrospective analysis, we make the assumption that bail-in is applied to all banks and examine the impact this would have had on banks of different sizes and listed banks. Our findings suggest that equity holders would have been the most impacted by bail-in, especially for the largest 30 banks accounting for 81% of total Eurozone bank assets. However, additional conversion to equity for subordinated and senior debt investors would have been required to ensure banks were adequately capitalized post bail-in. Depositors would not have required bail-in for any of the institutions examined. We finish the study by examining a range of market and balance sheet based triggers for resolution, but find weak evidence in support of quantitative resolution triggers.
Many of the previous studies considering the European framework for bank resolution have primarily focussed on the legislative details or potential structure of the policy (Ignatowski and Korte, 2014; Dermine, 2013; Kudrna, 2012) . Others have outlined the commonalities between the resolution methodologies adopted during this crisis and previous crises (Mayes, 2009a,b) . Zhou et al. (2012) consider potential benefits and risks concerning implementation of a bail-in mechanism. Schoenmaker and Siegmann (2013) simulate the impact of national coordination of bank bail-outs on the efficiency of the resolution, finding maximum efficiency for a supranational approach. In the context of U.S. bank resolution legislation, Ignatowski and Korte (2014) develop a framework to test the impact of recent regulatory changes on banking risk. Our paper differs in many ways from the extant literature on banking resolution, applying the resolution framework retrospectively to Eurozone banks. While Conlon and Cotter (2014) also examine the impact of the European resolution framework, the current study focusses only on Eurozone banks governed by the SRM. Moreover, additional novel contributions to the literature on bank resolution are provided here, such as the consideration of the bail-in mechanism for the largest systemically important banks, listed versus unlisted institutions and an examination of potential resolution triggers.
3 The focus on large systemically important financial institutions is of particular value to regulators, as it informs regarding the potential outcome of SRM resolution during a period of severe market stress.
A large literature documents the propensity of fundamental and accounting based data to predict banking failure. Techniques employed by these early warning models vary considerably but tend to focus either on prediction of systemic crisis events in countries or failure of specific banks (Davis and Karim, 2008 warning models to predict banking distress by incorporating market information (Gropp et al., 2006; Sironi, 2003; Evanoff and Wall, 2001; Flannery, 1998) . In particular, evidence that equity market information may be of value in predicting bank distress has been well documented (Curry et al., 2008; Distinguin et al., 2006; Krainer, 2004) . In this paper, we contribute to the literature on bank resolution by examining, in a univariate framework, whether equity and fundamental information could act as a trigger for bank resolution. The addition of a quantitative trigger to the framework on bank resolution and recovery might help provide mar-3 Moreover, the BRRD and SRM frameworks have been finalized since the publication of Conlon and Cotter (2014) , and findings here, especially those regarding the treatment of senior debt holders and depositors, reflect this.
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ket participants with further clarity in light of the somewhat subjective nature of the proposed resolution triggers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the forthcoming European framework for bank resolution. The data used in the empirical analysis is described in Section 3. Empirical results relating to writedowns, bail-in and resolution triggers are detailed in Section 4. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
European Bank Resolution
Throughout the global financial crisis, a multitude of Eurozone banks required public intervention in the form of bail-outs to avert potential failure and associated financial disruption. The approaches adopted in the implementation of bail-outs varied substantially across jurisdictions, perhaps contributing to contagion and financial turmoil. Common to many bail-outs was a considerable level of state support.
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To reduce the social and economic costs associated with bail-outs and to mitigate the dangers of financial contagion, the European Commission has introduced a common bank resolution policy. The process of resolution refers to the restructuring of a bank that is failing or likely to fail by a resolution authority. • Safeguard the continuity of essential banking services,
• Protect depositors, client assets and public funds,
• Minimize risks to financial stability,
• Avoid the unnecessary destruction of value.
Some consequences of the BRRD are that banks and authorities will need to prepare recovery and resolution plans for a variety of scenarios, supervisors will be given the means to intervene in troubled banks at a sufficiently early stage and coordinated resolution tools will be available to national authorities.
The directive further lists the following range of circumstances which would lead to the triggering of a resolution for an individual institution:
• If it has reached a point of distress such that there are no realistic prospects of recovery over an appropriate timeframe,
• If all other private sector or supervisory intervention measures have proved insufficient to restore the bank to viability, and
• If winding up the institution under normal insolvency procedures would risk prolonged uncertainty or financial instability and, therefore, resolving the bank would be better from a public interest perspective.
In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the resolution authorities will have a range of tools available to them. These include facilitating private sector acquisitions, transferring institutions to a temporary bridge bank, separation into a 'good' and 'bad' bank, and, finally, bail-in of creditors.
This final bail-in option refers to the ability to recapitalize a bank through the write-down of liabilities and/or their conversion to equity, thus allowing the bank to continue as a going concern. By following the process of bail-in, the authority should be able to avoid, or at least minimize, the requirement for public funds in stabilizing a financial institution. The process of bail-in should result in equity investors being wiped out or diluted and management replaced. Moreover, should circumstances dictate, authorities will further have power to impose writedown or conversion to equity of liabilities held by higher ranked creditors.
Under the BRRD, bail-in will apply to any bank liability not backed by assets or collateral. Exclusions from bail-in include short-term inter-bank lending (under 7 days), client assets, salaries, taxes and pensions. Moreover, deposits protected by a deposit guarantee scheme will not be bailed-in but the guarantee scheme will be liable to assume corresponding losses. Authorities may choose to exceptionally exempt other liabilities from bail-in to prevent financial disruption or contagion.
Bail-in is to be applied to liabilities in order of capital structure ranking, with equity absorbing losses in full before any debt liabilities may be written down.
Once equity is completely written down, holders of subordinated debt and then senior debt-holders will be bailed in. Finally, deposits from natural persons and SMEs (including those over e100, 000) are to be preferred over senior creditors.
To assure the credibility of the BRRD framework, the regulator will prescribe that banks hold a certain level of securities not excluded from bail-in.
The BRRD bail-in rules will apply to all outstanding and newly issued securities from January 1 st 2016. Individual member states may also choose to apply the tool prior to 2016.
Single Resolution Mechanism
The BRRD provides guidelines to deal with distressed banks at a national level across all 28 European Union countries, in addition to provisions to resolve cross-country bank failures. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) was introduced by the European Council in order to ensure that member states who share the same currency or are supervised by the same bank regulator, the European Central Bank, adhere to the same resolution policy (Howarth and Quaglia, 2014) . from the banking sector. Once established, the SRB will be responsible for resolution decisions surrounding about 6, 000 banks in participating member states.
Decisions relating to the determination of whether an institution is failing or is likely to fail will be the responsibility of the regulator, the European Central
Bank. The SRB further retains the discretion to adjudge an institution as failing or having the potential to fail and may request information from the ECB. The target size of the SRF will equal 1% of all covered deposits in banks in participating member states, or about e55 billion based on 2011 balance sheets. The objective of the SRM is to achieve resolution without recourse to taxpayers in individual member states. While the SRB is responsible for decisions relating to which banks are to be resolved, the national resolution authorities retain responsibility for implementation of resolution actions.
Under the SRM, entities shall be deemed to be failing or likely to fail if any of the following conditions hold (The European Commission, 2014):
• The entity infringes or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the near future, infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of authorisation by the ECB, including but not limited to the fact that the institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete all or a significant amount of its own funds;
• The assets of the entity are, or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the entity will, in the near future, be less than its liabilities;
• The entity is, or there are objective elements to support a determination that the entity will, in the near future, be unable to pay its debts or other 9 liabilities as they fall due;
• iii. An injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the entity.
While the SRM provides for bail-in of institutions, national regulatory authorities shall decide on and implement any bail-in, if the SRB mandates resolution.
The order of priority of claims to be written down is to be in accordance with the BRRD. As with the BRRD, the relevant deposit guarantee scheme will be responsible for losses that would have been imposed on guaranteed depositors.
Next, we turn our attention to the data used in the analysis and the empirical results relating to impairments, bail-in and triggers.
Data
Fundamental accounting data relating to European Banks is sourced from In selecting the data, banks at the highest level of the business were selected, often resulting in the holding company level. This ensures no double counting, removing multiple aggregation across both holding and subsidiary institutions. An additional selection criterion, to ensure banks are deposit-taking, excludes banks with a deposit to total asset ratio less than 20% (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) . 
Empirical Results

Writedowns
The global financial crisis was the largest single catastrophe to hit banks worldwide since at least the 1930s. In Europe, the crisis resulted in public bail-outs of banks in a majority of jurisdictions. These bail-outs took various forms, including capital injections and nationalization. by surviving banks are also found to be a large proportion of total losses. Finally, while the number of nationalized banks was small, impairments experienced by these institutions were non-negligible. In summary, we have shown that losses experienced by European banks over the global crisis were large and distributed across the majority of countries. We later use these impairments as a benchmark when testing the retrospective performance of the SRM bail-in framework.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
7 The timing here corresponds largely to the transfer of impaired assets from banks to the Irish 'bad bank', the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA). [ Table 1 Large European banks account for a substantial proportion of total bank assets.
Eurozone Bank Balance Sheet
For example, the largest 20 banks accounted for 71.1% of all bank assets in Europe during 2006 (see Table 2 ). Given their systematic importance, we examine the funding position of the largest 20 banks in isolation. Across all years, the equity held by the top 20 banks is lower than the average level. The proportion of customer deposits, bank deposits and long term debt held by these institutions is also smaller than average. This suggests that, under a potential bail-in, these banks would have less available resources for the purposes of bail-in than the average European bank, a result that is borne out in our later analysis. Finally, the proportion of derivatives on the balance-sheet of the top 20 banks is larger than the average. Given the less than clear position regarding derivatives in the BRRD, large banks holding derivatives accounting for an extensive proportion of total liabilities may be of concern to regulators. Moreover, the smaller quantities of liabilities available for bail-in in these large banks may impact the credibility of the resolution framework. Given the funding background detailed, we next consider the application of bail-in to European banks according to asset size.
Bail-In -A Retrospective Analysis
We now retrospectively investigate the application of the bail-in tool provided for in the BRRD and SRM. To arrive at a required level of bail-in for each bank, the impairment charges accounted for over the period 2008 − 2012 are taken as the 14 baseline losses experienced. 8 In each case, we determine the proportion of each balance sheet liability required to be written down in order to cover actual losses experienced. Moreover, the aggregate level of writedown and equity conversion required to achieve the 3% leverage ratio mandated under the Basel III accord is calculated.
9
The analysis is presented for writedowns and equity conversions relating to bank balance sheets from 2006, although little qualitative variation in results is found for 2007 or 2008. The order in which bail-in is applied is structured in the same manner as that mandated by the BRRD. Importantly, this requires senior debt to be written down prior to any losses being imposed on depositors, which would not have been possible in all countries during the crisis. 10 One restriction on our analysis is the paucity of information relating to the proportion of balance sheet liabilities backed by assets or collateral.
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The first analysis, Table 2 , considers the proportion of balance sheet liabilities required for bail-in according to bank size. Previously, governments found themselves taking responsibility for liabilities of very large banks that were a significant proportion of GDP. As this ultimately impacted the sovereign, it is vital to under-8 It is important to note that definitions of loan impairment are heterogeneous throughout the EU and there has been a move to a more harmonised definition, which may result in an increase in impaired assets. However, Conlon and Cotter (2014) perform stress tests which demonstrate that depositors would not have been impacted by writedowns, even for much larger levels of impairments. We are grateful to our discussant, Alessandro Roselli, for pointing out this issue. In Europe, large numbers of small, unlisted banks exist but which account for a minority of total bank assets. In Table 3 , we apply the bail-in rules to listed and unlisted European banks in turn. While only 62 of the 701 Eurozone banks considered are listed, they account for 64.5% of all assets. Moreover, the total proportion of writedowns required to cover losses was 4.32% of total liabilities and equity, compared to 1.65% for unlisted banks.
[ Table 3 
Bail-In Triggers
Under the framework provided for by the BRRD and SRRM, the triggers for bank resolution are somewhat subjective. Troubled banks are deemed to be failing or likely to fail if they are expected to infringe the requirements for authorisation, if the assets are likely to be less than liabilities, if they are likely not to be able to meet debt repayments or if public intervention is required. However, the lack of a single definitive trigger or set of triggers could result in uncertainty, potentially leading to a spiral of doubt surrounding an institution or unnecessary resolution.
In the retrospective study of bail-in detailed, we have considered the actual bailout of banks as the trigger. We next investigate a range of potential quantitative market and balance sheet triggers, to determine characteristic differences between failed and surviving banks. 13 Market-based triggers are forward looking, capturing
13 Banks requiring nationalization and public capital injections are both considered as failed in the markets perception of a banks position. Balance sheet triggers are backward looking, revealing the reported financial position of the bank. Each of these has been extensively linked in the literature to the prediction of future banking distress and failure (Betz et al., 2014; Mannasoo and Mayes, 2009; Distinguin et al., 2006) .
Market-based triggers are considered in Table 4 for listed European Banks.
Four different equity-related triggers are contrasted for bailed-out and surviving banks, namely equity returns, total volatility, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. [ Table 4 about here.]
We next examine the ability of balance-sheet based triggers to differentiate between failed and surviving banks before and during the global financial crisis. Table   5 details changes in a range of balance sheet fundamentals. For instance, the total book equity of bailed-out banks increased by 20.3% between 2005 and 2006, while the analysis to follow. 14 Equity returns are calculated as the average monthly return and total volatility as the standard deviation of monthly returns. Systematic risk is measured using a market model, [ Table 5 It is important to note that our findings, while providing little evidence as to the benefits of quantitative triggers do not rule out the use of contingent liabilities. For example a number of banks have begun to introduce contingent convertibles (CoCos), securities which are convertible into equity if a pre-specified trigger occurs. For some securities issued, the triggers have been backward looking accounting and fundamental measures such as capital ratios (Glasserman and Nouri, 2012) . Forward looking market-based triggers may be more appropriate, easing the dangers of market manipulation or conversion errors (Sundaresan and Wang, 2013) . Moreover, by incorporating securities providing for bail-in directly in the capital structure of banks market participants have clear guidance before providing capital to institutions.
Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the literature by retrospectively considering the application of the recent European rules on banking resolution. Specifically, we focus on how resolution under the Single Resolution Mechanism would have impacted Eurozone banks during the global financial crisis. Our results indicate that Eurozone banks experienced total impairment charges of e621 billion over the period 15 Moreover, given the weak results using univariate models, it is less than likely that multivariate models would glean any additional information. Surv. Bail-in costs are calculated using total realized impairment charges, calculated as the sum of loan writedowns and non-recurring expenses between 2008 and 2012. Equity conversion assumes a required 3% leverage ratio post resolution. For each liability type, the proportion of each balance sheet liability required to be written down to cover these losses is then calculated. The data is comprised of Eurozone banks from twelve countries which are covered by the EU bank resolution framework. Table 4 : Bail-in Analysis -Market Triggers Notes: The potential of market-based triggers to indicate potential bail-in requirement is examined retrospectively in the case of European Banks. Equity returns are calculated as the average monthly return and total volatility as the standard deviation of monthly returns. Systematic risk is measured using a market model, r i = α i + βr m + ε i , where β gives the systematic or market risk and the average value of the squared residual, ε 2 i , measures idiosyncratic or firm specific risk. A difference-in-means test is performed for failed and surviving banks before and including the global financial crisis period. The Satterthwaite approximation for the standard errors is applied, which does not assume equal variances of the two samples.
